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Abstract. A key focus of contemporary agent-oriented research and engineering
is on open multiagent systems composed of truly autonomous, interacting agents.
This poses new challenges, as entities in open systems are usually more or less
mentally opaque (e.g., possibly insincere), and can enter and leave the system
at will. Thus interactions among such black- or gray-box entities usually imply
more or less severe contingencies in behavior: Among other issues, in principle,
the adherence of agents to norms cannot be guaranteed in such systems. As a
response to this issue, this paper proposes a logic-based approach based on the
notion of (possibly probabilistic) behavioral expectations, which are stylized ei-
ther as adaptive (i.e., predictive) or normative (i.e., prescriptive). Some features
of this approach are the enabling of "soft norms" which are automatically weak-
ened to some degree if contradicted at runtime, and the possibility to quantify
norm adherence using the measurement of norm deviance.
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1 Introduction
A key focus of contemporary agent-oriented research and engineering is on open multi-
agent systems composed of truly autonomous, interacting agents. This poses new chal-
lenges, as agents in open systems are usually more or less mentally opaque (e.g., pos-
sibly insincere), and can enter and leave the system at will. Among other issues, in
principle, the adherence of agents to norms cannot be guaranteed in such systems. As a
response, this paper proposes a logic-based approach to the modeling of open multia-
gent systems in form of probabilistic behavioral expectations, which are stylized either
as adaptive (i.e., predictive) or normative (i.e., prescriptive), and which can be adapted
dynamically at runtime. More concretely, we propose first a probabilistic logic for the
representation of agent actions and other events, event sequences, and beliefs and in-
tentions. Then, we define (event-related) normative and adaptive expectations on top
of this logic. Doing so, our proposal is a more or less direct logic-based variant of our
approach proposed in (Brauer, Nickles, Rovatsos, Weiß & Lorentzen 2002, Lorentzen
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& Nickles 2002, Nickles, Rovatsos & Weiß 2005), adopting the sociological viewpoint
regarding expectations and norms which was introduced in (Luhmann 1995a). With the
approach presented in (Castelfranchi & Lorini 2003) it has in common that expecta-
tions are based on intentions and beliefs regarding future events, but otherwise the two
approaches are unrelated.
Being a normative expectation is not sufficient to constitute a full-fledged social
norm (Boella, van der Torre & Verhagen 2007) by itself (mainly because expectations
do not by themselves lead to their announcement and enforcement), but all social norms
are necessarily grounded in normative expectations (Luhmann 1995b, Lorentzen &
Nickles 2002): Because only the behavior of an autonomous agent within some shared
environment is visible for an observer, while his mental state remains obscure, beliefs
and demands directed to the respective other agent can basically be stylized only as
mutable behavioral expectations which are fulfilled or disappointed in future events
(Luhmann 1995b). In the case of disappointment, an expectation can either be revised in
order to consider the new perception accurately (so-called adaptive expectations), or the
expecter decides to keep this expectation even contra-factually (so-called normative ex-
pectations), or to revise (resp. maintain) it only to a certain degree (adaptive-normative
expectations). In the two latter cases, the expectation holder likely also decides to take
action in order to make further disappointments of this expectation less probable (by,
e.g., sanctioning unexpected - so-called deviant - behavior). And in any case, the ex-
pectation can be strengthened/weakened if an expected repeatable event turns out to be
useful/useless afterwards.
Thus, we define normative expectations (and thus norms) via the degree of resistance
to environmental (e.g., social) dynamics in the course of time, wrt. how somebody else
should behave from the viewpoint of the expectation-holder. In addition, expectations
can address the behavior of the expecter himself also, which can be useful for the ex-
pecter in order to model his self-commitments (intentions regarding own actions), and
to communicate them to other agents in form of uttered expectations.
In order to make expectations expected (and thus socially relevant, e.g., as a norm), any
kind of expectation needs of course to be communicated to others and to be armed with
sanctions, if necessary, but concrete ways to do so are outside the scope of this paper.
As for the modeling of norms, we are mainly interested in representing behavioral
norms as mental attitudes of some norm giver, such as the designer of the multiagent
system (MAS). By representing even the designer of an agent-based application as an
agent conceptually, we suggest that the designer of open MAS should not and can not
be granted the omniscient, almighty position, as it is the case in by far most current
frameworks (e.g., (Ndumu, Collins, Owusu, Sullivan & Lee 1999, Bellifemine, Poggi
& Rimassa 2000, Bauer & Müller 2003)). Rather, we see her in the role of a primus
inter pares among other agents, who, although equipped with more power than “real”
agents, should aim for her goals socially (= communicatively) in interaction with the
other agents as far as possible. In addition, the openness of open MAS suggests that
the development of such systems can only be done in an evolutionary manner, with the
need to monitor the system and to improve its model even after deployment during run-
time. A way to put the conceptualization of system designers as agents into practice in
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a semi-automatic manner is to assign the designer an intelligent, agent-like case tool, as
we have proposed in (Brauer et al. 2002, Nickles, Rovatsos & Weiß 2005).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The next section introduces a formal
language for the representation of mental attitudes of expectation-holders. Section 3
then defines expectations using the means of this language, and Section 4 outlines how
expectations can be computed and adapted during runtime. Section 5 concludes.
2 A logic with modalities for intentions and uncertain beliefs
We use the languages proposed in (Cohen & Levesque 1990), Bacchus’ logic of uncer-
tain beliefs (Bacchus 1990) and own works (Nickles, Fischer & Weiß 2005, Fischer &
Nickles 2005) as a basis. Most aspects of these formalisms have the advantage that they
are well established and researched in Distributed AI in the context of modeling agent
beliefs and intentions.
The deliberatively rich language1 LprobDL we propose allows for the representation of
- event sequences and test expressions.
- uncertain beliefs denoting the an agent believes something with a certain degree.
This requires us to use a different semantics compared to the standard belief-
intention logics (i.e., for non-gradual beliefs).
- agent intentions. This is done in the same way as described above for standard Kripke-
type belief-intention logics. Note that intentions might encode demands the agent
is self-committed to and which are directed to other agents
(e.g., using Int(me, otheragent. done(someaction))).
- normative and non-normative expectations, and norm deviance. These major en-
hancements are spelled out in the next section.
2.1 Syntax
Definition 1. The syntax of well-formedLprobDL formulas F, F1, F2, . . . and processes
α, β, . . . is given by
F, F1, F2, . . . ::= p | > | ⊥ | ¬F1 | F1 ∧ F2 | F1 ∨ F2 | F1 → F2
| F1 ↔ F2 | ∃xF1 | ∀xF1 | < Pred > (x1, ..., xn)
| done(α) | happens(α) | now(< Time >)
| Bel(a, F ) | Bel(a, F, d) | Bel(a, F |c, d) | Int(a, F )
Expect(agent, normativity, event|context, strength) | ∆(event|context, deviance)
α, β, . . . ::= action | ai.action | any | α;β | α ∪ β | α ∗ | F?
Here,
1 which is expected to be easily tailorable to concrete application needs in order to reduce com-
plexity.
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– a, ai ∈ Agents (cf. below), being agents;
– x, y, z, i, j, k, xi, yi, zi being variables;
– < Pred > being a predicate symbol;
– action, ai.action ∈ A, with A denoting the set of elementary actions; every el-
ementary action can be indexed with an agent (e.g., agent3.assert represents the
communication act “assert” uttered by agent3);
– any is an arbitrary action;
– < Time > is a time point, denoted as a natural number;
– α;β denotes sequential process combination (i.e., (sub-)process α is followed by
β);
– α ∪ β denotes non-deterministic choice between α and β;
– α∗ denotes zero or more iterations of α;
– F? is a test operation (i.e., the process proceeds if F holds true);
– Bel(a, F, d) denotes that agent a (sincerely) believes with degree d that F , with d
being a real valued probability measure and 0 ≤ d ≤ 1;
– Bel(a, F ) is a shortcut for Bel(a, F, 1);
– Int(a, F ) denotes that agent a (sincerely) intends that F ;
– Bel(a, F |c, d) and Bel(a, F |c) := Bel(a, F |c, 1) are shortcuts denoting contex-
tualized beliefs (cf. below);
– Expect(agent, normativity, event|context, strength) (see next section), and
– ∆(event|context, deviance) (see next section).
See below for the meaning of done , happens , and now . Further, let Agents = {ai}
be the set of all agents (those currently in the MAS under observation, as well as all
other possible agents), Θ = {α, β, γ...} the set of all syntactically valid processes, and
Φ = {F, F1, F2, ...} the set of all LprobDL formulas.
Meta-LprobDL statements are given in natural-like language (e.g., "If |= F then |=
Bel(a, F, 1)"). In addition, we will sometimes write calculations and other functional
expressions directly within LprobDL formulas for simplicity, like in Bel(a, F, f(1)/2).
2.2 Model-based semantics
We propose the usual Kripke-style semantics of belief and intentions, with the "possible
worlds" (future as well as past) consisting of finite sequences of events here. Some of
these worlds are worlds the agents considers being true (i.e., consistent with the agents
belief), others are those worlds the agents wants to become true, thus consistent with
the agents intentions 2. Event sequences (or courses) are simply timely ordered, atomic
events such as agent actions, with finite length, denoted as event1; ...; eventn. If we
additionally assume some meaningful correlation or even causation among events, we
speak about (event) processes.
ALprobDL model is a structure (Θ,Events,Agents, Trajectories,B, I, Φ), where
Θ is the universe of discourse, Agents is a set of agents as specified above, Events is a
2 For simplicity, we do not explicitly introduce goals and desires. Instead, we assume that for the
purpose of this work that long-term and, in case of failure, possibly re-established intentions
could act as such.
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set of events, Trajectories ⊆ {(n, e) : n ∈ N, e ∈ Events} is a linearly ordered, de-
numerable set of worlds in form of event sequences, B : Agents × Situations →
[0; 1] is a personalized and discrete probability measure over the worlds at all par-
ticular time points (so-called situations), with Situations = {(w, i) : i ∈ N, w ∈
Trajectories} and ∑s∈SituationsB(agent, s) = 1 for some particular agent agent,
I ⊆ Trajectories× Agents× N× Trajectories is the accessibility relation for the
agent’s intentions (extended with time points, cf. below), and Φ is a predicate interpret-
ing function. B and I are serial, and B is in addition euclidian and transitive.
This structure defines an agent-specific probability distribution over 2Situations
by B(agent, S ⊆ Situations) =∑s∈S B(agent, s).
Let M be a LprobDL model, σ a sequence of events (possible world), n ∈ N (a
time point), ν be a set of variable bindings, relating elements of Θ, Events and σ
to variables. The satisfaction of some LprobDL formula F by M,σ, ν is written as
M,σ, ν, n |= F . To express that an event occurs between two time points n and m,
we write M,σ, ν, n . α / m (the exact meaning of this is given below).
With this, the model theoretic semantics of LprobDL is then given by the following
rules:
1. M,σ, ν, n |= now(< Time >) iff ν(< Time >) = n.
2. M,σ, ν, n |= happens(α) iff ∃m,m ≥ n : M,σ, ν, n . α / m (i.e., α is here an
event or event sequence which happens after time n.
3. M,σ, ν, n |= done(α) iff ∃m,m ≤ n : M,σ, ν,m . α / n (i.e., α is here an event
or event sequence which happened just before time n.
4. M,σ, ν, n |= Bel(a, F, d) iff B(a, {s : M,σ, ν, n |= F}) = d. This expresses
that agent a believes F with strength d if and only if the personalized probability
measure B equals d for all situations where F holds.
Since the relation B in LprobDL models is a probability measure, d = 1 − d′ if
Bel(a, F, d) ∧Bel(a,¬F, d′).
5. M,σ, ν, n |= Int(a, F ) iff for all σ∗, (σ, n, ν(a), σ∗) ∈ I . This rule states that
F follows from the agents intentions iff F is true in all possible worlds (event
sequences) accessible via I , at time n. Observe that it is not required that F is
brought about by a. The intention to perform or let someone else perform some
action can trivially be expressed with Int(agent1, done(agent2.action)).
The following defines the occurrence conditions for single and compound events:
1. M,σ, ν, n . α / n+ i iff ν(α) = α1; ...;αi and σn+j = αj , 1 ≤ j ≤ i. This means
that the event sequence α happens next to time point n in world σ.
2. M,σ, ν, n . α ∪ β /m iff M,σ, ν, n . α /m or M,σ, ν, n . β /m (i.e., either α or
β occurs in the time interval n...m).
3. M,σ, ν, n.α;β /m iff ∃k, n ≤ k ≤ m : (M,σ, ν, n.α/k)∧ (M,σ, ν, n.β /m)
(i.e., β follows α).
4. M,σ, ν, n . F? / m iff M,σ, ν, n |= F . I.e., the test expression F? occurs iff F is
true.
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5. M,σ, ν, n . α ∗ /m iff ∃n1, ..., nk, n1 = n, nk = m∀i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m : M,σ, ν, ni .
α / ni+1. This states that α∗ occurs iff a sequence of αs occurs.
Like in temporal logic, we can express that F will eventually be true using ∃α ∈
A : happens(α;F?). ¬∃α ∈ A : happens(α;¬F?) says that F holds always.
We define logically contextualized beliefs by Bel(a, F |c, d), c ∈ Φ ≡ Bel(a, c →
∃α : happens(α;F?), d), and beliefs contextualized with event sequences α with
Bel(a, F |α, d), α ∈ {α1; ...;αn : αi ∈ A} ≡ Bel(a, happens(α;F?), d).
Sometimes, we abbreviate Bel(a, done(α), ...) with Bel(a, α, ...).
The semantics of < Pred > (...),¬,∧,=,∨,>,⊥, ∃, ∀,→ and ↔ is as usual in
FOL with equality.
We provide a partial axiomatization, focusing on belief and intention modalities.
The LprobDL belief axioms schema includes the well-known K45 (aka weak S5 plus
consistency) modal logic axioms schema, adapted for personalized, probabilistic be-
liefs:
Axioms 1.1:
K (closure under consequence)) (Bel(a, F ) ∧Bel(a, F → F ′))→ Bel(a, F ′)
D (consistency) ¬Bel(a,⊥)
4 (closure under positive introspection) Bel(a, F )→ Bel(a,Bel(a, F ))
5 (closure under negative introspection) ¬Bel(a, F )→ Bel(a,¬Bel(a, F ))
Sometimes, a belief logic also includes the necessity rule: "If |= F then |= Bel(a, F, 1)",
which we do not adopt. I.e., our agents need not to be aware of valid formulas.
Contrary to the famous approach (Cohen & Levesque 1990), which focuses mainly
on the interaction of intentions and goals, but in accordance with (Herzig & Longin
2002), we think that the relationship of intentions to the agent’s belief is most important.
It is governed by the following Bel-Int bridge axioms:
Axioms 1.2:
BelInt1 Int(a, F )→ ¬Bel(a, F ). Agent a intends F to become true only if she does
not already believe that F is true already.
BelInt2 Int(a,Bel(a, event|context))
∧¬Bel(a, event|context)⇒ Int(a, event).
BelInt2’ (alternatively) Int(a,Bel(a, event|context, e))
∧¬Bel(a, event|context, e)⇒ Int(a, occurs(event|context, e)).
This probabilistic version of RelIntBel2 in (Herzig & Longin 2002) would ex-
presses that disbelief in the occurrence of an event with probability e while in-
tending to belief the event occurs with this probability forces the agent to intend
the event to occur with probability e
(denoted as Int(agent, occurs(event|context, e))). This also expresses that in
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case the agent has no particular belief regarding the occurrence of this event, she can
bring about her introspective intention to belief in the event even without intending
the event itself (e.g., by exploring new perceptions, or by improving her reason-
ing process). This axiom becomes very important later in the context of normative
and adaptive-normative expectations. Unfortunately, the modality Int(...occurs)
is not part of LprobDL, and maybe shouldn’t be, since it is not clear what "shall
occur with a certain probability" means exactly. Since we feel that adding such a
modality could be problematic, we provided a simpler, harmless variant in form of
BelInt2.
BelInt3 Int(a, F ) → Int(a,Bel(a, F )). Note that the opposite direction should not
hold: There are other means than intentions to change one’s belief, e.g., exploration.
BelInt4 Bel(a, Int(a, F )) → Int(a, F ). This allows for introspection regarding an
agent’s intentions.
The following schematic axioms deal with uncertain belief:
Axioms 1.3:
Bel(a, F, d)→ d ≥ 0
Bel(a, F, d) ∧Bel(a,¬F, d′)→ d′ = 1− d
Bel(a, F ∧ F ′, d) ∧Bel(a, F ∧ ¬F ′, d′) ∧Bel(a, F, d′′)→ d′′ = d+ d′
∀x : Bel(a, F, 1)→ ∧Bel(a,∀x : F, 1)
For δ and Expect, cf. the next section.
Being interested in open systems with truly autonomous agents only, we delibera-
tively do not propose any axioms which would enforce sincerity, collaboration or other
properties of benevolence.
3 Expectations as combined mental attitudes with temporal
dynamics
Expectations can be weighted in two ways, namely, w.r.t. their strength and w.r.t. their
normativity (or inversely, their adaptability). The strength of an expectation indicates
its “degree of expectedness” (also called expectability): the weaker (stronger) the ex-
pectation is, the less likely is or should be its expected fulfilment (violation). Against
that, the normativity of an expectation (both weak and strong expectations) indicates
its deliberate “degree of changeability”: the more normative (adaptive) an expectation
is, the smaller (greater) is the change in its strength when being contradicted by unpre-
dicted actual actions. With that, the strength of a lowly normative expectation tends to
change faster, whereas the strength of a highly normative expectation is maintained in
the longer term even if it is obviously inconsistent with reality (e.g., some other agents’
activities). Fully normative expectations (normativity = 1) ignore the actual occur-
rences of their modeled events completely, as long as they are not adapted “manually”,
whereas fully adaptive expectations (normativity = 0) follow the resp. beliefs of the
expecting agents, given these beliefs follow themselves any incoming new information
regarding the expected events. Thus it is assumed that there is a continuous transition
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from weak to strong strength and from low to high normativity. The difference between
the probability and the expectability (normativity-biased probability) of a certain event
is called deviance. So, we can model both gradual and, to some degree, auto-adaptive
normative expectations - in contrast to, e.g., binary-style modalities like obligation and
permission as in deontic logic.
Some examples (adopted from (Brauer et al. 2002)) of combinations of expectation
strength, normativity and deviance:
rules that govern criminal law (strong/non-adaptable/rather low deviance in western
countries: even hundreds of actual murders will not alter the respective laws, and most
people think of murder as a rather exceptional event);
habits (strong/adaptable,low deviance: before the times of fast food, people took full
service in restaurants for granted, but as fast food became popular, they were willing to
abandon this expectation);
adherence to public parking regulations (strong/hardly adaptable/high deviance: al-
most everyone violates them even if they are, in principle, rigid);
and shop clerk friendliness (weak/adaptable/indefinite deviance: most people expect
bad service but are willing to change their view once encountering friendly staff).
Thus, the term “expectation” is inherently ambiguous, as it deliberatively combines
subjective, demanding expectations (reflecting the goals and intentions of the expecting
agent) and the empirical likeliness of events (desired or not). In this regard it is worth
to state that even the strengths of fully-adaptive expectations are not necessarily prob-
abilities (from a frequentist point of view), because expectations are maintained (“ex-
pected”) as a part of the belief a subjective observer has, and do not necessarily take into
account enough “real world” facts to determine expectation strengths objectively when
he sets up his expectations. So, not only (adaptive-)normative, but also fully-adaptive
expectations could theoretically be used to represent individual, contra-factual prefer-
ences (“desired probabilities”, so to say) instead of likelihoods. But such contra-factual
yet non-normative expectations converge immediately to probabilities, since they are
“willing to learn”, so to say.
Starting from these observations, we define the semantics of a so-called normative
(normativitiy = 1) or adaptive-normative (0 < normativity < 1) expectation held
by some agent as his intention to make (or keep) the strength of his belief regarding
the (re-)occurrence of the expected event identical with the strength of this expectation.
This can be weaker than to intend a certain probability of the event, but as we will see
later, in the most common case we actually get by with defining (adaptive-)normative
expectations as the intention to make the environment conforming to the expected state
to some degree. In contrast expectations without any normativity, simply corresponding
to uncertain beliefs, are called adaptive expectations.
At this, “intending a probability” can be understood as either aiming at bringing about a
certain frequency of a repeatable event, or as the will to provide occurrence conditions
for the event that make it probable to a certain degree.
Formally, an agent’s expectation (denoted as Expect) is a mental attitude, represented
as a logic modality, and defined as follows:
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Definition 2.
Expect(agent, ψ, event|context, e) :⇔

Bel(agent, event|context, e)
∨Int(agent,Bel(agent, event|context, e)))
if ψ > 0
Bel(agent, event|context, e) otherwise
Hereby, e is the expectability, and ψ ∈ [0; 1] is the normativity of the expectation. ψ = 0
leads to the special case of an adaptive expectation.
event can theoretically be any proposition, but focusing on actions, if we use event, it
should in fact be done(event) (the done operator omitted for simplicity).
For convenience, we set
Expectt(agent, ψ, event|context, e) ≡ Expect(agent, ψ, event|context, e)∧now(<
t >) to denote expectations held at a certain time.
ψ = 0 leads to the special case of an adaptive expectation.
Bel(agent, event|context, b) denotes that agent believes that event occurs with
probability b in context 3, and Int(agent, p) denotes that agent intends p to become
true (if agent is not capable to bring about the desired fact or action directly by herself,
this shall include the intention to make other agents bring about p etc., i.e., to use them
like a tool)
We write Expect(agent, event|context, e) as an abbreviation of
Expect(agent, 0, event|context, e), and Expectt for Expect, when the time point t
at which the expectation is held matters and can not be derived from the context (for ψ,
Int and Bel analogously). Note that t is not the time point at which the event (should)
occur(-s). If we would like to express that some event will or should happen at a certain
time, we would have to encode this time within context.
The exact normativity (except from distinguishing if it is above zero or not) is not
used in Definition 2, because the normativity prescribes how an expectability auto-
evolves in the course of time with new information, if the expectability it is not set
“manually”. If the normativity is zero, the expectation is set equal to the belief of the
expecter immediately. Otherwise, the expectability adopts gradually to the belief when
both differ, with a “learning rate” of the expectation inverse to the normativity.
Our definition of expectation is build straightforwardly upon probabilistic versions
of the KD45 and belief-intention axioms usually used for multi-modal logics of men-
tal attitudes (e.g. (Herzig & Longin 2002)), and is related to Sadek’s want attitude
(Sadek 1992).
Given the agent’s belief (e.g., obtainable from an expectation via the so-called de-
viance, cf. below), the following proposition obviously holds, given
Expect(agent, ψ, event|context, e):
Observation 1:
3 We can also use this syntax to denote expected expectations:
Expect(agent1, ..., Expect(agent2, ...)...).
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Int(agent,Bel(agent, event|context, e))
if (ψ > 0 ∧Bel(agent, event|context, ne), ne 6= e)
Bel(agent, event|context, e) otherwise
If we would either drop the usual Bel(p) → ¬Int(p) axiom in belief-intention
logics, or introduce alternatively maintenance intentions (Bratman 1987) (denoted as
IntM ), Definition 2 would change to
Definition 3. (alternatively to Definition 2)
Expectalt(agent, ψ, event|context, e) :⇔

IntM (agent,Bel(agent, event|context, e)))
if ψ > 0
Bel(agent, event|context, e) otherwise
The agent can achieve the intention to revise his belief in several ways, possibly
even concurrently.
i. Change the world This is considered to be the usual way to enforce adaptive-normative
and normative expectations, either by execution of the expected events by the ex-
pecting agent herself, or by bringing about the intended events indirectly (e.g., by
asking other agents to do so).
ii. Explore The agent can try to obtain new perceptions in order to change his belief
by exploration. Here, the (adaptive-)normative expectation serves as a kind of hy-
potheses, and the agents strives after new evidence in order to support or refute
it.
iii. Wait This is actually not covered by the original intention at time t, but is a way
to automatically decrease the “strength” of the intention (i.e., the degree and dura-
tion of the self-commitment) in consecutive time steps instead: If the normativity
is below 1, in the longer term the expectation learns (i.e., adapts to the current
probability), provided the probabilities of a certain event remain stable enough to
be learnable (cf. 4). Practically, this happens if the expectation holder failed to de-
crease the deviance actively (due to insufficient social power, for example). The
adaptation of the expectability to the probability in this case can nevertheless be
desired, and it can even be a prerequisite for the enforcement of less flexible and
thus likely more important expectations.
iv. Ignore the deviance Here, the agents simply believes that the expected event will
occur, possibly ignoring reality thereby:
Bel(agent, event|context, e)∧Expect(agent, ψ, event|context, e) holds in any
case then.
Such deliberative ignorance appears to be irrational for intelligent agents, but is a
common attitude of human agents and obviously somewhat functional for them.
In any case, the identification of certain expectations with beliefs regardless of de-
viance might be reasonable for artificial agents in case the event belief is obtained
from an unreliable source.
A less debatable use for such deliberative ignorance is to set the normativity greater
zero in order to filter out (“flatten”) temporal and insignificant fluctuations of prob-
abilities.
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In all cases except from iv., we assume that the expectability is equal to the proba-
bility (in case the normativity is zero).
Note that even for the cases i.-iii. so far no assumptions have been made on how e
has been obtained - an agent is basically free to hold any expectabilities she likes / is
interested in from her subjective and possibly irrational viewpoint.
Definition 4. The deviance∆ of an event regarding a certain expectation (or vice versa
of an expectation regarding an event) is defined with
∆(event|context) = e− p,
given thatBel(agent, event|context, p) andExpect(agent, ψ, event|context, e) holds.
We integrate deviance measures into LprobDL using
M,σ, ν, n |= ∆(event|context, e−p) iff ∃e, p, ψ :M,σ, ν, n |= Bel(a, F |context, p)∧
M,σ, ν, n |= Expect(agent, event|context, ψ, e).
Sometimes we use ∆(event|context) = e− p as a syntactic variant.
A deviance can intuitively be seen as an indicator of the effort that would be required
to make a normatively expected event happen, and as a measure for the compliance of
the event-generating agent with the expectation, whereas the normativity is intuitively a
kind of “stamina” of the intention (the strength of a self-commitment. Please remember
in this regard, that we allow intentions also to be denoted as desired behavior of other
agents).
Trivially, the deviance can be used to retrieve a probability p from an expectability.
There is also a conjunction with the utilities of events: If the normativity is larger
zero, the utility for the agent to reach the specified probability is certainly larger zero
also. The expectability might correspond to the utility of the event in this case (but this
is to state a heuristic only, suggesting further research).
Observation 2:
Except from the case iv. above (belief despite ignorance of event occurrences)
Int(agent, ∀ti, t ≤ ti ≤ t+ h : ∆t+i(event|context) = 0)
holds at time step t. At this, h is a possibly infinite intention horizon which determines
how long the expectation is maintained, and ∆t+i is defined analogously to Expectt.
Finally, we want to further simply the semantics in case the probability of an in-
tended event is irrelevant:
Observation 3:
(Expect(agent, ψ, event|context, e) ∧Bel(agent, event|context, en), en),
→ Int(agent, event), if en < e
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4 Computational adaptation of expectations at runtime
The expectability of an event is a function of event probability and normativity, whereby
the normativity can be interpreted as the "stubbornness" of the expectation, or, inversely,
its flexibility. After the expectabilities and normativities of adaptive-normative expec-
tations have been obtained from goals and intentions, they are exposed to reality, so
to say. One driving force for the run time adaptation of such expectations is the ac-
tive influencing of the domain of the expected events in order to enforce normative and
adaptive-normative expectations, another is to let such expectations adopt to empirical
expectations passively. The following shows how this can be done in dependance from
the normativity. As important special cases, the following definition covers expectations
with normativity zero and one also.
To this end, it is assumed that for an event event|context corresponding to a certain
EN node an initial expectation strength θ(event, context) = P0(event|context) ex-
ists. We define thereby for convenienceBelt(a, F |context, d) ≡ Bel(a, F |context, d)∧
now(< t >) and Pt(a|context) = d⇔ Belt(a, F |context, d), denoting a probability
stated at time t (not the probability of an event happening at time t) (cf. Definition 2 for
Expectt). Given a normativity ψt and a probability Pt(event|context) (e.g., in form
of a belief) obtained empirically at time step t, the expectation strength at this time step
can be calculated recursively as follows. This way to calculate Expectt is not obliga-
tory, other ways to calculate adaptive-normative expectations could be reasonable too,
depending from the concrete application.
Definition 5. WithEt(agent, ψt, event|context) = e↔ Expectt(agent, ψt, event|context, e),
Et(agent, event|context, ψt) ={
θ(event, context) if t < 1
E′t+1(agent, ψt, event|context) otherwise
with E′t(agent, ψt, event|context) =
E′t−1(agent, ψt, event|context)
−∆′t−1(event|context)(1− ψt)
if t > 0
θ(event, context) otherwise
∆′t(event|context) is calculated as
E′t(agent, ψt, event|context)− Pt(event|context)4.
This (non-mandatory) way to calculate Expectt reminds of the econometrics tech-
nique of Exponential Smoothing used for the smoothing and extrapolation of non-linear
4 Calculating Expectt(...) using Expect′t+1(...) is done just in order to get rid of the delay of
one time step in the adaptation of Expectt(...) to Pt(...) that would exist otherwise.
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Fig. 1. Unattended adaptation of an expectability (t→)
time series. It calculates a flattened version (with a flattening degree depending on the
normativity) of the graph ofPt(event|context), and letsExpectt(agent, ψt, event|context)
converge to Pt(event|context) at least if Pt(event|context) remains constant with in-
creasing t, and ψt remains constant also. The normativity (i.e., the expectation adapta-
tion rate) itself does not change.
If, e.g., ψt = 1, the expectation strength e in
Expectt(agent, ψt, event|context), e = θ(contex, event)will remain constant, what-
ever the empirical evidence is. In contrast, if ψt(agent, contex, event) = 0,
Expectt(agent, ψt, event|context, e)withe = Pt(event|context) applies at all time
steps.
Example:
Figure 1 shows the time and normativity dependent expectabilities (abbreviated with
Et) of an event a, with ψ0..20 = 0.95 and θ(a, context) = 0.4. Being a fictive event,
the potential effect the announcement of these values to the event generator (a commu-
nication partner of the agent, for example) would have, is not considered. The agent
parameter has been omitted.
5 Conclusion
Most traditional formalisms for normative systems clearly restrict the agents’ auton-
omy without any concept of flexibility. In demarcation from such approaches, we aim
at avoiding this by accepting autonomy even from social norms as a necessary charac-
teristic of agency that must not be ruled out, and sometimes even can not be ruled out
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at all, as it is typical for truly open multiagent systems. Based on Luhmann’s theory of
social systems and our previous works (Brauer et al. 2002), this is in the line of Castel-
franchi’s view: A socially oriented perspective of engineering order in agent systems
is needed and most effective (Castelfranchi 2000). In addition to that, this sociological
grounding also makes our approach different from approaches that apply sociological
concepts and terminology in a comparatively superficial and more or less ad-hoc man-
ner. Thus we hope that the introduction of adaptive-normative expectations opens a new
perspective of multiagency and normative systems.
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